


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

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Selected Studies From STRATEGIC REVIEW

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[Periodical: The Palestinian State: A Balanced Option;
The Path to Self-Rule is Difficult"]

[Text] [passage omitted]

'Foundation' Strategy in the Occupied Territories

In the advanced institutionalized nations, change does not happen unexpectedly in state institutions if their head is absent unexpectedly or suddenly, because the infrastructure exists to deal automatically and programmatically with this incident, by virtue of a mechanism that exists for this purpose. Matters are put in their proper place as rapidly as possible. Our aspiration, naturally, is to reach this degree of domestic effectiveness in the future.

The "structural" strategy of the occupied territories, starting with the creation of institutions to bear the burden of transition requirements, through the achievement of national harmony, and continuing on to the stage of an independent state, is a problem that needs clear, calm, and logical thought. We think that the foundation for this strategy should rest on two cornerstones: Palestinian political structure and struggle side by side with the economic and social growth struggle and its ramifications. There is no sense in developing one of them without the other. In addition, working in these two directions will contribute to the acceleration of development and the lessening of difficulties that the institutions of the transitional period will face, starting with credibility, trust, consciousness, and capability. These matters arise in a community striving to consolidate its rights, with the assistance of friendly nations and nations with influence in the contemporary international balance.

The political foundation, with its various dimensions, is a reality despite all its faults, inasmuch as those standing upon it have proved their abilities on local and international levels, especially under the aegis of the intifadah. Therefore, the second part of the struggle, economic and social growth, is the one that must be dealt with and concentrated upon. This is especially true since the concentration began in the second half of the 1980's and continues today.

In this regard, the problem of economic and social growth, whose battles these institutions will have to take on, does not stem from errors of application, as many have frequently stated. Rather, it is connected with the quality of social development and growth. It is up to institutions to reach a formula concerning their application and to point out shortfalls in the type, number, and performance of several existing institutions. Here, we will discuss all of them from the technical aspect, especially those that have a connection with the economic and social growth process. We can mention the following:

- Banks and financial institutions for developmental purposes;
- Vocational and administrative training institutions;
- Programs required for developmental enlightenment, especially those directed toward young minds and practical ideas;
- Applied and field programs in the social sciences

In addition, without the slightest doubt, there is a clear imbalance in how these institutions are distributed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Despite the fact that the effects of this present distribution on the practical effectiveness of these institutions have not yet become clear, some think that they are negative effects, beginning with those who profit from the institutions' services and from the institutions themselves. This is because of the restrictions on, and uses of, resources for comprehensive growth and because of the distance of these institutions from broad sectors of the masses, due to their locations. Accordingly, this imbalance must be overcome through a reconsideration of how to distribute the institutions and their branches to reach all of the elements of production everywhere they are located and to cover all of the areas of the occupied territories.

If this process of diffusion is completed in accordance with national requirements, the following question comes to mind: Are Palestinian institutions in the occupied territories candidates to form an infrastructure for Palestinian independence? The answer to this question is definitely in the affirmative, but with some strong reservations on the following two levels:

A. Planning Level:

- A central planning agency must be created to draw up an integrated social development plan, in accordance with real concepts that reflect our future goals. Among this agency's functions should be the development of top-level policies for the institutions that we are discussing.
- Roles must be distributed among the existing institutions in every field, using the principle of specialization. We must work to create and build institutions required for the proposed institutionalized development structure.
- A supreme watchdog committee must be established as an outgrowth of this central planning agency. The committee would have the task of periodic or annual monitoring of the institutions, along the lines of Israel's state watchdog committee, for example.
- Many international institutions that have development programs in the occupied territories complain about a vacuum that impedes development activities in these areas. We have reference here to the UN Development Program, which has taken on the task of determining sites for development, in light of the absence of any clear development plan prepared by the Palestinian people for the occupied territories.

This situation is also applicable to economic assistance offered by the European Common Market, which faces many obstacles vis-a-vis determining ways to finance and types of projects, along with methods of granting this

assistance, which has recently begun to be resolved. Accordingly, the creation of a central planning agency will, of itself, anchor the principle of the independence of the Palestinian decision, with the support of official international institutions and agencies, to deal with the waste occurring in the assistance granted to the Palestinian people. This is a matter of great urgency, which must be examined precisely.

B. Performance

- The performance level of institutions is strengthened by implementing the principle of democracy in their operation. This neutralizes the factor of personalization, which threatens the existence and continuation of the institutional framework. Institutionalism is not only a tool to carry out projects or activities; it is also a concept and methodology required for national rebirth in its broadest forms.
- The gauge for determining the performance level of institutions is how close they are to producing results that will achieve the national goals for which they were created. Two problems arise here that affect this measurement:
 - The lack of a clear national strategy, as previously mentioned in this context; and,
 - The unavailability of required funds from homogeneous sources. This gives certain institutions a choice of two options: either adhering to the national program, which means gambling on sources of its financing, or maintaining an acceptable minimum, in exchange for keeping sources of financing open.
- The level of institutional performance is tied to the principle of specialization and of giving priority to efficiency in managing institutions. This requires that there be more concentration, on the part of the institutions, on developing the human factor—the most important production element—in order to create and develop these skills so that, subsequently, they can take over matters in appropriate positions.

On the other hand, authorizing persons to take over basic positions in institutions solely for personal, group, or other considerations, leads to reverse results. This sows the seeds of destruction within the all-important program of institutionalization, by taking away its institutionalism.

Gap in Relations Between Institutions, Masses: Causes, Results

For the purpose of crystallizing a strategy like this, and in order to correct the course of national institutions in all aspects to serve the citizens, certain gateways must be used.

The total number of popular and civil institutions in the occupied territories' public and private sectors is approximately 800, including various charity and cooperative associations, various unions, masses' institutions, etc. This is based on Maqdes [Jerusalem Center for Strategic Studies] estimates derived from local and diverse Israeli statistics.

Perhaps, a possible measurement to use as a point of departure to study the existing institutionalized structure is to divide that structure into registered and other, nonregistered institutions, in the sense that registered institutions are subject to direct monitoring by the Israeli authorities and are required to submit annual reports on the sum of their activities. This leads to a weakening of their effectiveness and a deviation from their course, at least in terms of control. This causes confusion and convulsions in their structure when unqualified informers, who do not enjoy credibility with the masses, are named to manage them.

Among these institutions are official agencies, such as Social Affairs, where the responsible Israeli quarters enjoy the right of supervision, follow-up, and approval over all activities that they pursue, including intervention in the operation of the institution and in ratifying the board of directors, either through legal procedures or the right to accept or reject any person who is not in accordance with the policies and goals of the occupation or who is known to be in violation of Israeli Government directives.

Unregistered institutions include women's organizations and social and volunteer action committees, as well as specialized committees, such as relief, agricultural, or medical services, and other committees, which were formed by popular initiatives in the mid-1970's. These were formed for many reasons, most importantly, an increase in political and national awareness among individuals in various segments of the Palestinian population and an increase in the authorities' repressive operations and prosecution, which were and continue to be carried out against national movements in the existing institutions. In addition, life requirements of citizens were diverging, and, consequently, a gap emerged between the masses, as a whole, and the existing institutions. This gap was caused by increased popular perception of the extent of the traditionalism of some prominent persons, despite their granting of diverse services to the masses. However, these services were not universal nor on a sound basis, to the extent that they had any part in causing this gap to disappear or weaken.

This group exists without the approval of the occupation authorities. Part of it was born against the background of political and class disputes and competition among PLO factions, resulting in the establishment of parallel and similar institutions, in terms of their field of work. In addition, there was classism, which sometimes colored the administrative aspect and which was embodied in the tradition of persons who were administratively and professionally unqualified for high, sensitive posts because political development was the basic criteria for employment. This, perhaps, caused the institutions not to be based on sound administrative foundations and weakened administrative and professional levels of supervisors. This was applicable to levels of performance on the scene, as a result of these institutions being converted into political centers for one tendency or another.

In any event, the effect here was not limited only to the occupation, but rather, it went beyond it to other areas, especially Jordan and Egypt, because they previously administered Palestinian territory. Consequently, the PLO found itself in a clash for control of these institutions, which were subject to various parties' influence, increasing vacillation, and weakness in their activities and administrative actions. That was apparent in the deterioration of their administrative structure, the decline in their levels of performance and productivity, and their instability.

Moreover, the lack of congruity of these institutions' boards of directors' views with regard to client quarters' policies and sources of support impeded their work and limited their ability to achieve their goals.

In comparison, the role of masses' institutions may be stronger after the intifadah, as a result of their direct contact with the community's requirements and their earnest attempts to fill the vacuum originating from the poor performance of the originally existing institutions. In addition, these institutions adopted the role of mobilizing individuals and various social strata.

The question that arises here, therefore, is: Have all West Bank and Gaza Strip institutions been able to build bridges of mutual, positive trust between themselves and the masses, or are there still many problems and obstacles preventing this cohesion?

Institutions of all dimensions and specialties were established in an attempt to be a foundation for the national authority structure, based on self-reliance and the capability to conquer all fields in which the Palestinian society operates, whether it was labor, education, or charity, in order to overcome the shortfall in public services. In addition, they attempted to develop feelings of collective responsibility and harmony among the citizens, invest in the welfare of the Palestinian citizen, deepen his sense of national identity, and highlight the united efforts of the Palestinian people, apart from many other public goals. However, these services and aspirations faced obstacles that weakened their role. This was reflected on the level of relationship between the institution and the citizen. The most important of these obstacles include:

1. Disregard of geographic distribution of these institution, both in quantity and type. A quick look at the institutions' locations shows us that among the 800 institutions in the occupied territories, there are about 741 institutions and associations in the West Bank alone, and only 59 in the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that this number does not represent the true needs of the population or their numbers.

Even on the institutional level, we find that the central region (Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Ramallah) has a monopoly. No less than 40 percent of the charitable associations are registered in these districts. In addition, most levels of economic and educational activity are concentrated in this region, which points to the fact that distribution of institutions in the occupied territories is a

farce, affecting the level of public activity and highlighting the gap in relationships with the masses, especially in areas where institutionalized activity is virtually nonexistent.

2. Certainly, Israeli occupation practices vis-a-vis these institutions have at all times diminished, and will diminish, their effectiveness and activities, which influences the continuity between them and the masses. There are constant cases of house arrests and searches, as well as imprisonment of their activists and closure of certain institutions.

3. The presence of a number of institutions in group and political competition has been reflected in the situation of services offered to the masses. At times, this has led to deviation from their basic goals. In another sense, competition in granting services aspired to win over the street, to the benefit of one group or a specific orientation and not necessarily for popular services themselves. Moreover, the purely political nature, which a number of institutions represented, at times negatively affected their level of service performance. This does not mean the adopting of a negative position in order to reject this issue. Palestinians, as a result of their special circumstances and their existence under the occupation, have clearly been in the center of the political arena. However, intense concentration of this nature sometimes contributes to convulsions in relations between the institutions and the masses, especially when these masses perceive that political action has negatively influenced the level of services and benefits that they are given. Let us cite the following examples:

Labor unions, which were originally established to protect the interests of workers in various institutions and sectors, tend to try to overcome political issues which they consider pressing, at the expense of matters no less urgent, such as pursuing the workers' various issues with employers, especially since most of what constitutes a menace to a worker is his economic circumstances. In a simple review, we find that the worker's wage in the occupied territories is clearly low, since the worker's wage in Israel is nearly 54 percent higher than the wage in the occupied territories. On this basis, the unions have not devised an integrated plan, by which they can reach an agreement with employers to impose a ceiling on wages, guaranteeing a reasonable limit on the workers' living requirements. This matter sometimes weakens the bridge of communications between worker and union. The lack of good training and education programs, which would give the Palestinian worker constructive development, is a stumbling block to reaching an excellent relationship between worker and union. Another obstacle that makes union action relatively ineffective is the limited structure of institutions in which workers operate. No less than 90 percent of all industrial institutions, operating in the occupied territories, have less than 10 workers. Therefore, the worker does not perceive the importance of union activity on a broad scale.

4. The various services and projects, offered to the masses by these institutions, were of a consumer nature

and did not concentrate on production that would give the masses an opportunity to have some degree of economic independence. However, some institutions and associations have overcome traditional form, in terms of concentrating on giving basic services to the masses, in an attempt to lay foundations that would contribute to the social structure and firmly anchor national concepts.

The nature of these consumer services was a negative factor with regard to development, even though acknowledging that these services, to some degree, contributed to a lessening of citizens' concerns. However, they also had the effect of increasing Palestinian dependence on Israel's economy because, in the period that preceded the intifadah, local markets were open to Israeli products. Local markets depended greatly on the Israeli market for no less than 90 percent of its imports.

Awareness of this issue began during the intifadah, when the unified national leadership demanded that citizens boycott Israeli products. Therefore, serious thought began to be given to the introduction of new projects of a productive nature in order to serve this goal and strengthen Palestinian independence.

5. The weakness of the administrative cadres and a lack of needed expertise. The general goal for which the institutions were founded, represented by integrated, community development, certainly requires expertise and administrative competency commensurate with the institutions' declared importance. This issue forms a clear dilemma that is highlighted by the performance of existing institutions. To strengthen this statement, we can cite the following example: A leading institution wrote a development plan with a total budget of \$15 million, which was allocated to establish several growth projects. After four years, it became clear that not less than 30 percent of this budget had been wasted on administrative expenses pertaining to salaries, communications, etc., which constituted the squandering of this amount. On the other hand, all of this institution's projects were unable to employ more than 1,000 persons. How can we find a solution to the dilemma of spreading unemployment among the masses, which amounts to 34 percent, according to Maqdes's figures, in light of poor administration and bad planning of projects, which originally were undertaken to end this phenomenon?

6. Many institutions still give inadequate consideration to the role of women, which make up half of Palestinian society. We find that their share of existing projects, for example, is very small and, at most, totals 12 percent in certain leading institutions, despite efforts of feminist associations to get rid of this inadequacy.

7. The emergence of individualism in institutional performance, in the sense that direct responsibility for an institution strongly influences its total public activity. Sometimes, the individual cannot make a positive and successful example from this performance. Institutions that lack some democratic vision create many problems, either in relations among their workers or in relations with the masses. It has been proven, in a practical way,

that the prevailing of a collective spirit in an institution is a guarantee of success in its programs and strengthens its relationships with the masses.

8. The lack of a clear developmental program for institutions, especially because their goal must transcend the issue of creating a specialized or skilled Palestinian citizen in a specific area and lead to the building a technically, responsibly, and culturally integrated citizen.

Finally, the absence of logical, educated coordination between the various institutions negatively affects the masses' view of them. The masses assume that a comprehensive national framework should be formed by the diversity of institutions and multiplicity of specialization, which, ultimately, would lead to the beginning of real growth for society and the masses. Perhaps the factor of political competition, which was mentioned previously, is one of the reasons for the failure to achieve this positive coordination.

These matters have caused a kind of gap in relations with the masses. Perhaps what is needed at this stage is to give consideration to creating a general plan that would avoid such errors and difficulties so that institutions, which could form the core of an independent state, can be designed.

'Types of Existing Institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Objectives and Methods of Operation'

The following is a rapid review of the most important infrastructure sectors in the occupied territories, subordinate to civilian, Israeli administration, and popular or national.

I. Health institutions

Health institutions are one of two types:

- Government institutions, which are controlled by the occupation authorities. They are subordinate to the civilian administration, which determines the operation of all of the centers belonging to them. There are 18 governmental hospitals in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- National health institutions, which include two sectors. The private sector includes private hospitals that are owned and operated by a number of specialized doctors. There are 15 such hospitals. The welfare sector includes institutions that offer various services. They are aimed at assisting all Palestinian citizens, facilitating care for the sick and needy, and accelerating health awareness. These associations exempt the poor and families of prisoners from health care fees.

In addition, there is a health cadre, such as the Federation of Medical Relief Committees, which includes a number of doctors, nurses, pharmacists, laboratory technicians, and health workers who work on a volunteer basis on weekends for the purpose of contributing to raising health standards by offering primary health services in remote areas, raising citizens' consciousness

vis-a-vis health problems, combating infections and contagious diseases, etc. There are eight of these health cadres operating in the occupied territories.

II. Economic institutions

There are two types of institutions, agricultural and industrial, which include:

- Agricultural cooperatives, represented by a group of agricultural cooperative institutions located in various places in the occupied territories. There are 40 agricultural marketing associations, 21 livestock production associations, and 11 olive presses. Their activity concentrates mainly on offering certain services to member farmers to help them in marketing their products in the East Bank, through issuing certificates of origin. In addition, some associations carry out land reclamation operations. As for livestock associations in the West Bank, they operate projects to manufacture fodder, fatten lambs, and breed poultry.
- Lending institutions, including the Economic Development Group (EDG). EDG's goal is to make available the circumstances and components required to advance economic development in the occupied territories, on the basis of invariables based on principles of self-reliance, ending economic subservience to others, and creating as many job opportunities as possible in the local labor market. This institution's most important activity is in the field of advancing credit for economic projects, in addition to certain other fields, such as training and holding development seminars in certain sectors. It also plays a role in liaison, and studies pertaining to marketing agricultural products directly in European markets.
- The Palestinian Cooperative Institution, which attempts to find employment for the out-of-work and helps to establish projects for prisoners and the liberated to prevent emigration. In addition, it participates, by means of granting loans, in creating and strengthening economic initiatives among a great many of the poor and limited-income people to establish their own cooperative projects.
- The Arab Development and Credit Company (ADCC). This is a nonprofit Arab company founded in 1987 to grant loans for projects and work to develop the economy.
- United Agricultural Company (UAC). It was established in 1988 as a nonprofit organization concerned with developing the agricultural sector by lending money and helping small farmers. Its objective is to improve their capabilities in the agricultural process and in the agricultural market and to give farmers direction and guidance.
- The Arab Institution for Technical Development (TIDC). TIDC helps develop the national economy's infrastructure, by means of conducting field and statistical studies to define the priorities of appropriate projects for development. In addition, it helps to develop specialized skills in production, marketing, and administration, by means of guiding and training

the work force, providing projects and programs to absorb the skills and development, finding the resources required to finance the projects in which the institution participates, and encouraging the investment of national capital in various economic projects by finding profitable investment opportunities.

There are also institutions based on the economy, such as chambers of commerce, industry, and agriculture. There are 10 of these institutions in the occupied territories. They recently joined together under the umbrella of the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce, which has its headquarters in Jerusalem. This federation was established to work for reorganizing and representing commercial and industrial interests, administering their affairs, establishing relations with local and foreign chambers of commerce and industry, and strengthening close ties among their members. In addition, the federation is the liaison with the authorities for all matters to do with trade and industry, pertaining to their practices vis-a-vis the merchants.

Industrial institutions are productive institutions, either privately owned or stock companies. They include factories that produce food, beverages, tobacco, textiles and clothing, leather and leather products, lumber and wood products, rubber and plastic products, chemicals, and minerals and mineral products. There are about 4,200 industrial units in the Arab occupied territories.

There are also unregistered institutions that operate in economic fields, which are equivalent to an agricultural cadre, such as agricultural relief committees, composed of a group of agricultural engineers, whose goal is to offer volunteer agricultural services to small farmers, in terms of guidance, agricultural instruction, new alternative procedures that are suitable for the local structure, and showing farmers the best way to use chemicals and insecticides. In addition, they encourage developing the home economy, as a local, productive way to contribute to self-reliance.

III. Financial Institutions

There are two kinds of financial institutions. The first is private financial organizations, which have substantial material resources (money changers). Maqdes has estimated that there are 250 registered money changers in the occupied territories. Commercial banks are the second type, such as the Bank of Cairo-Amman and its branches and the Bank of Palestine in Gaza. These banks operate within narrow banking circles, represented by the acceptance of deposits and savings and facilitating currency conversions.

IV. Educational Institutions

There are also two types of educational institutions:

- Institutions subordinate to the Office of Training and Education in the civilian administration. These include governmental schools, which total more than 900, in addition to five junior colleges. There are also 13 vocational training centers.

- National institutions, which include more than 230 private schools, in addition to educational institutions subordinate to the Council of Higher Education, which is tantamount to a national organization to oversee educational and cultural issues, including studying the situation and drawing up the most suitable plans and solutions for the situation's requirements and problems. It also implements these plans within available resources, in addition to supervising and helping to improve higher education. Seven Palestinian universities are members of this council, along with 11 junior colleges. There are four private community colleges that are not included under this council's framework.

V. Research Institutions

There are 43 institutions that specialize in scientific research, of which there are two kinds. The first kind of research institution specializes in applied science, such as domestic agriculture, water, and laboratory analyses. There are four of these centers. There are other centers that specialize in humanitarian sciences, which form the bulk of these institutions. In addition, there are scores of journalistic institutions.

VI. Local Administrative Institutes (Municipalities)

These institutions carry out vital functions in the field of economic development. They also play a prominent role in education and political awareness by getting citizens to participate in the management of their local affairs and to cooperate in popular efforts to fulfill the needs of the people. Municipalities carry out many functions, including city planning, building and improving streets, monitoring the construction and destruction of buildings and their alterations, providing the population with water and electricity, etc. There are 29 municipal institutions.

VII. Labor and Professional Unions

The basic tasks of these institutions are concentrated in union matters of concern to their members. They operate on a professional, functional, or labor basis. There are two kinds of unions: labor unions, which are joined together under the General Federation of Labor Unions—totaling more than 100 unions, and professional unions, such as doctors, pharmacists, engineers, agriculturalists, dentists, teachers, and journalists.

VIII. Social Institutions

There are more than 215 associations. These institutions, which are engaged in social affairs, are subordinate to the civilian administration. They are compelled to submit annual reports and are subject to periodic monitoring. They are also exposed to the authorities' interference in their elections and are granted operating permits. However, registration does not mean that these institutions revolve in the authorities' orbit. There are three federations of charity associations. The goals of these federations are to watch over the mutual interests of the associations and members, coordinate their efforts, encourage the creation of new associations, devise general policy for mutual services, and settle any disputes that may arise. The General Federation of

Charity Associations is a connecting link between its member associations and governmental bodies and associations. In addition to offering financial assistance to member associations, which concentrate their activities on providing social services, including care for orphans, the elderly, and the disabled, they give financial and other assistance to the needy, prisoners' families, and the wounded, and train women in various fields, such as dressmaking, eliminating illiteracy, and educating seniors. In addition, there are associations that specialize in health matters.

There are also unregistered institutions, known as the masses' organizations, such as:

IX. Volunteer Work

These organizations are aimed at providing activities for young people from rural and poor areas and refugee camps. The youths perform volunteer work, such as building agricultural roads, staffing cemeteries, and helping farmers pick fruit. All of this requires manual labor. There are four cadres for volunteer work.

X. Women's Cadres

These organizations play a role in mobilizing women, first, by providing basic services in fields concerned with the woman and children, and second, by providing services in early education, training women, eliminating illiteracy, and awareness with regard to nutrition and health. In addition, there is interest in projects and productive activities aimed at fulfilling a number of pressing requirements at one time, in order to provide women with economic independence. There are four operating women's cadres: the Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees, the Federation of Palestinian Female Workers Committees, the Federation of Palestinian Women's Committees, and the Federation of Women's Committees for Social Action. [passage omitted]

Seven Million Tons of Oil Required Each Year by State by 2000

Many times during the intifadah, occupation authorities prevented oil products from reaching different parts of the occupied territories. They did not allow gasoline, kerosene, or heating fuel tankers to cross into these areas to unload their cargoes into fuel dumps. Moreover, they cut off and continue to cut off electricity on various occasions. Anyone who witnessed the intifadah in these places knows the extent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip's need for various petroleum derivatives. Life as we know it has been and can be stopped by a simple decision by the occupation authorities not to provide us with fuel.

In the stage of self-rule and the ensuing period, regardless of its nature, the occupied territories will be at a point where they must control the availability and supply of energy to the Palestinian consumer, whether that be for daily consumption or as a strategic reserve. This makes it necessary for the Palestinians to perform a detailed study of the available options by which we can guarantee continued availability of fuel at suitable cost. This is

especially true because oil prices have a direct connection with economic growth and, consequently, are reflected in the individual's living standards.

Despite the extreme strategic importance of this subject, it has not been given adequate concern as yet. The evidence for that statement is the uncertainty that any accurate study that deals with this subject in the detail it deserves exists.

Discussing the energy question from the Palestinian point of view requires taking the following matters into consideration:

- Defining, or at least estimating, the occupied territories' present requirements with regard to petroleum derivatives, as well as our needs by 2000;
- Determining the sources from which we can obtain energy at suitable costs and terms;
- Determining the means of transporting energy from the source or sources to the occupied territories, ways of storing it, and the manner in which these derivatives will be supplied to the consumer (distribution); and,
- Defining the political interests and international economic relations that will influence decision-making in this regard.

In this study, we will review these four main points, beginning with the occupied territories' present and future energy requirements.

Present Requirements

From most of the studies and statistics available concerning the occupied territories, we have been unable to find numbers that define the quantities of fuel derivatives that are now being consumed in the occupied territories. Therefore, we felt that we could deduce the figures required for this matter based on a local study and from elements of basic consumption. Despite the fact that Maqdes aspired to accuracy in obtaining statistics, it must be stressed that these numbers will only be estimates, with a large percentage of objectivity and credibility involved, i.e., they are not 100 percent accurate. Their purpose is to give statistical indications about quantities and volume of various energy derivatives consumed in the occupied territories.

Among the most important derivatives consumed are:

1. Kerosene

In view of the fact that the occupied territories' present population totals 1.75 million (2 million, according to statements of the Israeli minister of housing on 2 August 1992), there are approximately 257,000 families in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (with an average of seven persons per family).

Estimates that we obtained indicate that the average annual family consumption of kerosene is 180 liters, so that annual consumption of this material (257,000 times 180 liters) is 46,260,000 liters.

2. Gas

Other statistical data shows that more than 75 percent of family houses contain gas ovens of one size or another. According to estimates, the average consumption of gas cylinders is one cylinder per month, containing 15 kg of compressed gas. Therefore, total annual consumption of this material (192,750 homes times 12 months) is 2,313,000 gas cylinders. In addition, there is another 15 percent that is used in restaurants, hotels, and other places, i.e., approximately 346,950 gas cylinders.

Thus, the annual volume of consumption is 2.7 million gas cylinders.

3. Heating fuel (oil)

Statistical data indicates that only 15 percent of the homes (7 persons per home) in the occupied territories use central heating in the winter. The average annual consumption per house is approximately 2,000 liters of fuel. Accordingly, the volume of consumption of heating fuel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (38,550 houses times 2,000 liters) is 77.1 million liters.

In addition, 25 percent of offices, companies, and public and private institutions use this fuel, i.e., 19 million liters. Consequently, the annual consumption of heating fuel in the occupied territories totals 96 million liters.

4. Diesel fuel

The number of vehicles that depend on diesel fuel in the occupied territories, including trucks, buses, and taxis, is estimated at 25,482, according to 1990 statistics. The average daily consumption per vehicle was said to total 30 liters for a period of 300 days per year, considering trucks to be parked for an average of 65 days each year.

Therefore, annual diesel consumption (25,482 vehicles times 30 liters times 300 days) is 229,338,000 liters.

5. Gasoline

Most of the gasoline consumed in the occupied territories is by private automobile. They total an estimated 70,000, with average daily consumption of gasoline per car equaling 15 liters. Average annual consumption, therefore, is (15 liters times 365 days times 70,000 cars) 383 million liters.

6. Motorcycles

The number of motorcycles is 835, with an average use of 5 liters of gasoline per day. Average annual consumption is (835 times 5 liters times 365 days) 1.52 million liters [sic].

7. Electricity

A study concerning electricity, published in issue No 14 of AL-NASHRAH AL-ISTRATIJIYAH, indicated that the occupied territories' consumption of electricity was 445 million kilowatts per year, according to 1990 statistics. At that time, the Palestinian's average energy consumption equalled a one to ten ratio to the Israeli's average consumption, i.e., nearly 254 kilowatts.

8. Solar Energy

Solar energy is used daily to heat water by means of solar panels. Statistics derived from various sources indicate

that more than 50 percent of the houses in the occupied territories are equipped with solar panels, whose number totals 128,500 panels. One panel has a capacity of 250 liters of water, and the water temperature can be raised from 8 to 70 degrees centigrade. Accordingly, energy exploited from the sun to heat water totals 2.25 million kilowatt hours, calculated as follows:

Energy consumed is the weight of the quantity of water multiplied by the specific heat of water (4.2 kilojoules) multiplied by the difference of heat degrees (approximately 60 degrees centigrade). The weight of the heated water is 250 liters times 128,500 (number of panels), which equals 32,125,000 kg. Note that the density of water equals 1 kg per liter.

By applying the above equation, it is clear that the solar energy used to heat this quantity of water is:

32,125,000 kilograms x 4.2 kilojoules x 60 (difference of heat degrees)

3600 seconds equals 2.25 million kilowatt hours.

From all this, it is clear that the occupied territories' annual energy consumption, at the present time, is as presented in the table:

Annual Energy Consumption	
Oil and oil derivatives	755,000 tons
Electricity	445 million kilowatts
Gas	2.7 million cylinders of gas
Solar energy	2.25 million kilowatt hours
Soft coal	none
Shale oil	none
Wind power	none
Power from waves	none

Energy Requirements in 2000

Despite the fact that there is only eight years until 2000, it is expected that a fundamental change will occur in our use of energy, in terms of amount and type, during the next few years. This change will be due to several reasons, including the nature of conditions of the occupation under which the occupied territories have lived for the past 25 years and the developments that will crystallize in the Palestinian economy and society after independence. If we want to attain the Palestinian's average energy consumption in 2000, it must be done by means of measurement in comparison with Israel and Jordan.

Israel currently consumes 18 million tons of oil per year, i.e., about four tons per person. On the other hand, Jordan presently is consuming about 2.5 to 3 million tons, i.e., an average of .75 tons per person, in comparison with .42 tons per person in the occupied territories.

In the worst of circumstances, it is unlikely that the Palestinians' average annual consumption of oil in 2000 will be less than 2 tons per person. Accordingly, the consumption by the Palestinian state, with a population

of 3.5 million by that year (a natural, annual population increase of 3.2 percent to 2000 is expected to net 1 million), will reach 7 million tons of crude oil.

This means that any infrastructure planning in this field must take into account this consumption quantity as, at least, an estimate.

With regard to electricity, it is expected that the volume of annual consumption will reach five times the present consumption, i.e., some 2.25 billion kilowatts annually.

Energy Sources

Sources of national energy, used by man, are varied. They include those extracted from the earth, such as oil, gas, and soft coal, and those that we obtain directly from the rays of the sun or other means by which man attempts to obtain energy, such as ocean waves or wind.

Energy derivatives include electricity. The occupied territories buys most of its energy consumption requirements from the Israeli Regional Company. In this regard, we must have an alternative for electricity purchased from Israel. The task of providing this alternative will be the responsibility of the future Palestinian state government.

It is worth pointing out that the electrical energy industry in the world is diverse in accordance with the special nature of each nation. Some nations use atomic technology (nuclear generating plants) to produce electricity; others, such as Turkey, rely on their water resources. In those areas close to us, we find that Jordan uses thermal generators that rely on oil and gas, as is done at the al-Husaysn thermal plant near al-'Aqabah in southern Jordan.

In short, the occupied territories in their future structure will rely—for the biggest part of energy consumed—on traditional sources of oil, as do most non-oil producers. It will import its needs from exporting nations, such as Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States, or from Iraq. Moreover, benefit must be derived from the special nature of the Palestinian environment and geography in order to obtain energy from other sources. We should mention here the possibility of generating electricity by means of seriously studying the project of a canal between the two seas, if that is proven feasible, in agreement with neighboring countries. There is also the use of wind power, which can contribute to the generating of not inconsiderable amounts of electricity, for purposes of illumination and operating small workshops, as well as intensive use of solar energy. The search to find supplementary sources of energy requires creating specialized technical apparatus under state auspices.

Moreover, the above estimates of present and future energy consumption in the occupied territories require prior planning because of the nature of the infrastructure required to funnel energy derivatives to the consumer in order to provide the nation and citizen's daily and strategic needs.

Means of Transporting Energy From the Source

In any event, it is expected that the future Palestinian state will be supplied with oil by means of imports from neighboring Arab states—Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, or from Iraq. It is possible that it will be transported from these countries to Palestine via one or all of the following means:

- By land, from Iraq through Jordan, transported by tanker trucks, as is the case now. Jordan and Iraq were forced to follow this procedure after Saudi Arabia decided to stop supplying Jordan with oil as a result of its support for Iraq during the Kuwaiti occupation crisis and the Gulf war. At present, more than 600 tankers are transporting oil from Iraq to the oil refinery in al-Zarqa' each day and to the thermal electricity generating station in al-'Aqabah. Over the midterm, one can demonstrate the need to extend an oil pipeline from Iraq across Jordan and then to the Port of Gaza to supply these areas and to export the surplus to world markets by means of ships from the Palestinian state's port in Gaza.
- By sea, from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states by means of oil tankers, which can pass through the Red Sea and Suez Canal and go from there to Gaza to unload their cargoes. This reinforces the case for the possibility of building an oil refinery in the Gaza Strip area. Saudi oil could also be shipped over Jordanian territory as a Tapline branch to the Gaza Strip. From there, it could be exported to Western nations. In this case, it would be more feasible to export Gulf (or more precisely Saudi) oil through this pipeline to Syria and Lebanon than through the Tapline, since it could be used for two basic purposes simultaneously:
 - Providing free oil to the occupied territories (in exchange for oil transport transit fees)
 - Activating economic activity, which would contribute to its economic prosperity and, consequently, strengthen the peace process in the area.

In any event, our oil requirements should, in principle, compel us to plan to build:

- a deep port in Gaza;
- an oil refinery in Gaza or Ariha; and
- thermal electricity generating plants; both the Gaza Strip and the Ariha area could compete for them.

The following branch installations could be produced from these infrastructure foundations:

- high-tension lines to convey electricity from the electricity generating plants, either in Gaza or Ariha, to consumer areas;
- water purification plants and sewers;
- main road networks connecting these installations; and,
- buildings and units to serve this sector.

The strategy of providing oil to the Palestinian state at appropriate costs and terms, and the process of building refineries, determining locations to build refineries and

all their basic subsidiaries, such as purification plants, electricity generators, etc., require a keen view of future changes, political variables, and economic allies that exist now or may arise in the future. Accordingly, the extent of the progress and development of the future Palestinian state will determine, in advance, the essence of the role that the future Palestinian state will play on the Arab-Israeli and Arab-Arab levels, not only in accordance with the results of bilateral and multiparty negotiations that are now being conducted among Arab nations and Palestine, on one hand, and Israel, on the other, but also by the results of Arab-Arab relations, either positive or negative.

However, it is certain that what is desired from the Palestinian delegation and its supporting cast, especially as it pertains to multiparty discussions, is to draw up all of the options, possibilities, and scenarios that could achieve maximum gains for the future Palestinian state. Attention must be directed to new standards that govern the new world order and the need for those countries that border the Palestinian state, by virtue of the Palestinian people's experience with Israel for more than 25 years, to offer the expertise to qualify Palestine to play an effective role in influencing the development and prosperity of the area and the Middle East.

Israeli Defense Strategy Faces Two Options

The concept of future political relations between the Arabs and the Israelis, which may possibly be achieved against the background of the present negotiations, will remain a pawn to the balance of power among these parties. This means that the expected peace treaty will be subject to collapse, so long as the region's countries are not liberated from Israel's destructive military capability.

Certainly, discussion about disarmament agreements in the Middle East should be linked, to a considerable extent, with the nature of the expected political solution between the parties to the dispute. Radically resolving political problems, which have existed for a long time, will definitely lead to bolstering and revitalizing efforts made to make the region free of weapons of mass destruction.

Accordingly, there is a firm connection between safeguarding the expected peace treaty and eliminating destructive weapons. [passage omitted]

A question arises in this regard: Is it possible to reach an agreement about disarmament in the region that will ensure security stability between Arabs and Israel?

Before answering this question, three main points must be made that clearly influence the acquisition of arms in the Middle East region and that, by their elimination, might make the situation more realistic than with their presence:

- The arms race in the region is strongly linked to political tensions among the countries, especially between the Hebrew nation on the one hand, and Arab nations on the other.

- Israel's regional aspirations have contributed to increased fears on the part of the Arabs and, consequently, increased arms purchases.
- The history of arms control in the Middle East was, and still is, governed by outside factors, in the sense that the arms-exporting countries are primarily responsible for the region's militarism and its countries' possession of nontraditional arms.

Military Conditions

There are several basic factors that will contribute to achieving that agreement. Military experts believe that there are two central conditions, whose achievement will be decisive in any disarmament process. They are:¹⁾

- The existence of a political desire to give up certain weapons systems owned by specific parties; and,
- The existence of the power to attain the parties' commitment to any measures to which agreement is reached.

These two conditions will, evidently, be difficult to achieve with regard to the arms race in the region because of a clear fundamental justification, which can be summarized as follows: The causes of the conflict or political struggle, represented by Israeli occupation of the occupied territories, still exist.

Accordingly, one does not think that the parties will sign a treaty to ban the spread of nontraditional arms, so long as the fuse of war has not yet been removed from the region.

Even if a political solution is achieved between the two sides, the course of events at the present time does not indicate the possibility of reaching a final, enduring solution that would guarantee Israel's complete withdrawal from the Arab territories (West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon).

Absolute Security!

Another issue that is linked with the first cause pertains to Israel's strategy aimed at maintaining its status as the biggest regional power in the area under the slogan of "absolute security." This requires Israel's reliance on the use of force because of its belief that force is the only way to exercise policy, despite the fact that force is just one of the ways, not the only way. Israel still believes that outside threats exist, not only from the Arab side, but also from other countries in the Middle East, such as Iran. Therefore, Israel tries to plan for every eventuality to confront these threats, including building an offensive army to go along with the defensive strategy, which requires attacking in order to settle matters and achieve overwhelming, rapid victory.²

This fact will cast its shadow in the future, i.e., after the peace treaty is signed between the Arabs and Israelis. It should be remembered that the Arab parties to the dialogue with Israel, at the present time, do not represent all of the Arab nations, but are limited to the confrontation states (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the PLO) in addition to Egypt, which has already ratified a peace treaty with Israel. This means that a great majority of

Arab nations will not participate in the peace treaty. Even if we assume that some of the other Arab nations will join in the peace process, there will be other nations, such as Iraq, that will continue to reject the principle of establishing normal relations with Israel, at least in the first stages.

Nonparticipation of one or more nations in the Middle East region in joining in a disarmament treaty or in agreeing to the clauses of a political solution means that the arms race in the region will continue, especially on Israel's part. Therefore, the success of such treaties will require the participation of all of the nations in the region, a matter that might require many years.

Furthermore, this equation is, to a considerable degree, linked with the Israeli strategy and the future American role in the region. Israel makes a distinction between political treaties pertaining to cooperation among nations and curtailing its armaments. The evidence for that is that, despite the passing of many years since the Arab (Egyptian)-Israeli treaty, doubts still remain between the two parties. The inspection process by the two sides to determine whether either side has weapons of mass destruction has not occurred. In addition, Israel thinks that its military superiority is the insurance to protect political treaties, so that one of the parties will not risk violating the articles of treaties ratified with Israel. According to the statement of one prominent Arab: "Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons will prevent the Arabs from thinking about wanting to wipe it off the map. This will contribute to forcing them to conclude peace with Israel on terms that it deems suitable."

Furthermore, efforts aimed at divesting the region of weapons of mass destruction do not require just the efforts of the region's nations, but also the agreement of the countries exporting these weapons, because the arms race in the Middle East includes traditional weapons and some that go beyond the traditional, represented by importing modern and antiwar weapons from foreign nations. This has led to large amounts of arms, manufactured both in Eastern and Western nations, in some countries of the region. Moreover, part of these weapons were introduced into service in the armies in the region, before their use became generally widespread in the producing countries and their allies. As an example, there are many Russian weapons that never reached Warsaw Pact allies but were delivered to Arab countries, just as there are American weapons whose use is restricted only to American forces and Israeli forces.

The subject of the arms race in the Middle East has gone beyond that to include weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and germ-warfare weapons and even nuclear weapons, that surpass traditional arms. If Israel already has nuclear weapons, the next few years could see a number of regional nations obtaining this weapon in the same way chemical and germ-warfare weapons have been obtained. Certain Arab nations obtained these weapons within the context of the policy of balance with regard to Israel's weapons of mass destruction.³

The preceding means that these advanced weapons that have entered the region increased the competition to acquire them. The exporting countries were, and still are, responsible for arming the Middle East nations, especially if we note that these countries tried to make the region live in a state of nonpeace and non-war in order to control the markets of those countries that needed weapons. Consequently, they accelerated the rivalry to acquire arms after exploiting the political circumstances stemming from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, any process aimed at banning arms in the region must account for the international dimension, i.e., the arms-exporting countries. If that is not done, it will be difficult to stem the flow of arms to the belligerent nations.

Palestinian Side

An extremely important issue remains. This entails the efforts made to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the region and the connection with the Palestinians, who were denied participation in the multilateral negotiations because they lack a military state. Note that they are the party that will be most damaged in the future by this competition.

If we concede that the essence of the Middle East conflict is represented by the Palestinian issue and that the arms race was a result of this dispute, then the Palestinian side, which is negotiating as a primary party to sign a peace treaty with Israel, as is the Arab side, should presumably be a principal party in the consultations to end the arms race.

In this regard, there are fears regarding the continued ignoring of the Palestinian side, which is considered the weakest party in the conflict's equation because it has no defensive or offensive military arsenal. If war should break out in the region, this fact makes the Palestinians easy prey for the enemy. This is also true for another reason: Palestinian territory lies between the belligerent countries, making it a likely battleground. In addition, Israel is the strongest militarily and technologically advanced power in the region. Therefore, if one of the extremist Israeli political parties should come to power in the future, and in light of the military disparity between the two sides, it must be guaranteed that Israel will not invade Palestinian territory again, for whatever political pretext or, at least, that it will not carry out limited military operations inside Palestinian towns and villages for any reason whatsoever!

The logical alternative to that is represented by Palestinian participation in making sure that the parties concerned fulfill the provisions of the agreement that will be concluded in this regard if these countries succeed in agreeing among themselves on disarmament procedures.

Military Future in the Middle East

In general, the current political negotiations and their results will influence the military future of the Middle East, despite the fact that political treaties will not

absolutely end the arms race so much as they may achieve a relative calm on the military level among the hostile parties.

The nature of this truce will give the belligerents an opportunity to be more concerned with their domestic conditions (social and economic), after having reduced their military expenditures and created stability of a sort. This will, of course, be done without dropping the military option from future planning processes of this country or that, while giving the political option—and diplomacy in general—a larger principal role than would be the case in a state of hostility.

In light of this premise, there are several possibilities concerning the region's military future, which can be summarized in three tendencies:

Continuance

1. The possibility of the arms race continuing, as a result of noncompliance with the wishes of one or more parties during negotiating rounds. It is well known that the nature of negotiations means that parties to the discussions concede matters that, at previous times, were considered to be strategies that would be difficult to forego. However, convincing adversaries to sit around the negotiating table means being convinced of the possibility of reaching compromises, along with each side preserving its future dreams.

Accordingly, the arms race might continue because the factor of doubt and misgivings was not absent with regard to other parties, along with a lack of clear intentions, especially if the military option was not dropped by one of the participating countries that had signed the settlement document.

Reduction

2. Reducing the numbers of military forces that belong to parties participating in the political treaty and ending the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

This could stem from convincing these countries that the ratified agreements would achieve conditions of security stability and would keep war from flaring up for many years, especially in light of the economic problems that this region's countries face, represented by the arms race's drain on the human and natural resources of these countries.

On the other hand, those who hold to this view believe that signing a peace treaty will be accompanied by establishing the principle of nonaggression against others and creating a climate of cooperation among these nations, which would banish the specter of war from among them and revive normalcy and diplomatic and trade relations to an acceptable degree. This would mean that the arms race would be unjustifiable and incompatible with the new order.

No Man's Land

3. Continuing the region's military posture in the future as it is at the present time. This would be accompanied by the creation of a zone between the parties, which

would be weapons-free, with area and conditions to be agreed upon during negotiations.

This possibility is also linked to the extent of convincing these countries of the political agreement's advantage and its ability to create an atmosphere different from the previous state of hostility. In addition, the nature of the new world order, which crystallized after the Gulf war, may contribute to ending regional conflicts around the world, including the Middle East. This would mean a reduction in its countries' weapon supplies and would give international laws and resolutions a greater amount of respect.

If carried out, this option might require establishing a disarmament zone (no man's land) within the two sides' territory to be supervised by UN forces that would share in separating the parties, ending the state of direct confrontation between them. The UN forces could also help to contain disputes that might arise in the future.

In this regard, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement has led to the creation of new circumstances on the military front between these two nations. This has resulted in limiting the size of Arab forces permitted to no more than 22,000 men in the area extending along the western Sinai to a depth of nearly 60 km. It has also limited the type and number of motorized units and military equipment deployed in this zone.⁴

Moreover, the size of the Israeli Army on this front was considerably reduced (there are no exact figures available), while observation and early warning equipment was increased. The remainder of the Sinai has no deployment except ordinary police units and border guard battalions, equipped with light arms and ordinary vehicles. This means that the factor of surprise attack by the two sides, particularly by Egypt, as happened in the 1973 War, is unlikely.⁵

In the future, this principle could be applied to other parties. They could move to reduce military forces deployed on their fronts and be content with concentrating on monitoring equipment.

Regional Militarism

The truth is that Israel's presence in the Middle East has contributed, to a considerable extent, to the emergence of militarism in general. That has become clear through the following factors:

- Emergence of militaristic countries, although different from the Israeli example. For many years, this type of country, such as Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, has been directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other countries have been indirectly involved, such as Iran, Turkey, and certain African nations, such as Ethiopia.
- There are less militaristic countries, including both Arab and non-Arab nations, such as the Arab Maghreb countries, that have not turned into militaristic countries despite their preoccupation—in one way or another—with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The best examples of this are Tunisia, Morocco, and others.⁶

These two types confirm that the Israeli military strategy in the region has imposed various challenges on certain Arab nations as regards the arms race and from the aspect of building parallel institutions to those existing in Israel in an attempt to deter its efforts toward organized regional expansion.

In this regard, one can consider Arab armament as a natural reaction to meet Israel's strategic ambitions in the region. Therefore, the confrontation states, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, might be the Arab nations most concerned with the military aspect, while Jordan and other Arab nations are concerned to a lesser degree.

Another factor that has contributed to making militarism universal, in this region, has to do with the wars waged between the Arab nations and Israel, and their results in terms of arms races. The Israeli role has led to the outbreak of five wars with the Arabs, in addition to certain limited incursions inside a number of Arab nations (the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the raids against PLO centers in Tunisia) and repeated attacks against southern Lebanon.

These wars and limited skirmishes helped to make the decision to strengthen the military structure within the Arab nations to stop these Israeli provocations.

Accordingly, military experts believe that the Middle East region's militarism was systematically programmed because it absorbs more than 61 percent of world arms exports and, in the last five years, has accounted for one-third of weapons purchased. It has spent \$800 billion on weapons in the past decade.⁷

Arab-Israeli Balance of Power

It is clear that the balance of power in the region tilts toward Israel. Its superiority is not necessarily limited to quantity, because, in keeping with Israeli weapons development, it is also superior in quality. By means of this development, Israel has been able to overcome, to a considerable extent, Arab quantitative superiority, whether in terms of population, size, or other economic resources.

One must point out here that certain researchers, especially Westerners, have erred when dealing with Arab potential compared with its Israeli counterpart because they make the comparison between the "small" Israeli Army and the huge Arab forces. Consequently, they ignore the obvious fact that refutes Arab unity either ideologically or militarily. There have been many times when disputes between Arab nations have reached a point where forces have been massed on the borders. The recent Gulf war was clear proof of this disparity. Perhaps, this belief was a reason for foreign countries' sympathy with Israel, on the basis that it is a small country surrounded by powerful enemies.

In any event, apart from conflicting numbers about the balance of power and the arms race in the region, the existing gap between the two sides is a technological gap,

to be precise. It can be measured by comparisons or dimensions on three levels.⁸

- Basic level: Concentrating on learning these technologies and pursuing their development and application, identifying national requirements and priorities, and gaining the ability to examine, select, and use these technologies within the framework of independent national decisionmaking.
- Middle level: The ability to master these technologies and, perhaps, to be creative with them, using this creativity as an economic tool.
- Highest Level: The ability to design, market, and manufacture equipment and compete internationally in this arena. One should remember that Israel has completely mastered the first two levels and has begun to penetrate the third. Its complete mastery will form Israel's most important goal during the next few years, since military industries and war technology will play a leading role in this regard, in terms of Israel's ability to concentrate on research and development not only for the arms industry and to gain a larger share of independence, but also in developing civilian industries.

In comparison, the Arab nations—for the most part—are still trying to enter the lowest level or, in a few exceptions, are on the middle level, such as Egypt and Iraq. Therefore, the technological gap between Arabs and Israel is reflected on the military aspect in various fields of traditional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, or space weapons, which Israel has recently achieved within its plan of racing to acquire weapons in the region.

Israel's concern for quality superiority has led to the arms race in the Middle East continuing to Israel's advantage. It is expected that this concern will increase in the future, even after the political settlement, because of Israel's belief that Arab quantity will continue to increase in the future with regard to population and increase in army size and military equipment, as a result of importing advanced weaponry from the West and East. In addition, there is the Arabs' financial liquidity which could enable them to obtain technology in the future.

As a result of this concern and, at the same time, this fear, Israel has succeeded in achieving an advanced degree of self-sufficiency in arms manufacture, beginning with infantry weapons and up to ballistic missiles, in addition to achieving tangible progress in nontraditional weapons.

This picture became even clearer after the Gulf war. The Iraqi forces were considered—strategically—an advantage for the Arab eastern front vis-a-vis Israel, especially on the Jordanian and Syrian sectors where, prior to this time, they had participated in conflict in 1948, 1967, and 1973.

In the past, Iraqi power had helped to reduce the military technological gap between Israel and the Arabs, but the Gulf war brought back the disparity in the balance between the two sides.

In short, the relations that could be established in the future between the Arab nations and Israel will be governed by the balance of power between the two sides. This does not mean the absence of a state of truce after the signing of the political agreement. This could create a more stable atmosphere, but there will continue to be an interest in military continuity by both sides, although to a lesser extent than in past years.

Footnotes:

1. AL-SIYASIAH AL-DUWALIYAH, No 102, p 16
2. Source: Ahmad Mahmud, "The Arms Industry in Israel," p 15
3. SHU'UN FILASTINIYAH, No 215-216, pp 55-56
4. AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI No 18, p 110
5. Ibid
6. SHU'UN FILASTINIYAH, op cit
7. Ibid p 66
8. AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI, No 85, pp 107-108 [passage omitted]

War Hawk, Political Dove; General's Back to the Wall

Many political scientists believe that the important decision-making process is based, by necessity, on the country's actual situation, which is usually divided into four main types: dictatorships, monarchies, systems with power centers, and democracies or parliamentary systems. Systems vary according to the president or ruler's ability to make decisions.

Under the aegis of the dictatorship, the ruler unilaterally makes decisions, without any need for specific authority. In this case, self-interests govern his making any decision, and everything else concerned with the decision he makes is marginal. The second type (monarchies) is not considerably different from the first, except that contemporary monarchs might make room for royal retinues and advisors to participate in the decision-making process, but with the king retaining the highest authority. As for regimes with power centers, the meaning here is participation of institutions or specific groups in putting pressure on the official body to make decisions that suit their interests. The closest example of that might be the former structure of the Soviet Union from the political point of view, because the Central Committee, the leadership of the army and the unions, and the intelligence apparatus all participated, in one way or another, in forming official decisions.

The previous cases all involve the personality of the leader, which has the main influence in making decisions. In the last case, i.e., the parliamentary system, as in Israel for example, decision-making does not necessarily depend on the leader or the president, on the

assumption that there is more than one authority participating in formulating decisions. In this situation, some might question the lesson of this study.

In our opinion, despite our conviction about decision-making mechanisms in Israel, many analysts ultimately forget the personal side of their analyses, however small this factor, that completely objective studies lack. The second reason pertains to Rabin's provocative personality itself and his personal perceptions in choosing his subordinates for ministers and assistants. The Labor Party's recent election campaign in pursuit of power concentrated on Rabin's personality in its advertising. It issued slogans, such as "Israel awaits Rabin."

Rabin, From Palmach to Summit

Yitzhaq Rabin was born in Jerusalem in 1922, which makes him one of those unique Israelis. He was the first Israeli prime minister to have been born in Palestine, which left its stamp on his subsequent thinking, especially his views pertaining to the occupied Arab territories. According to the opinion of some of those concerned with Israeli affairs, the view of Jews who lived in Palestine before the occupation, in general, and those who were born here in particular, differ from the views of those who were born and raised in Palestine after the occupation.

In other words, the first generation looks at these occupied areas as being territory "acquired" through war, while the second generation sees them as a part of its history and, consequently, it is difficult for them to concede that these areas are not its territory.

Evidently, Rabin's family situation left its marks on this Israeli leader's personality. His father was an employee of the Regional Electricity Company. His mother was well known as an activist in one of the Zionist leftist parties to such a degree that people nicknamed her "Rosa Luxembourg", after the German communist woman of this name who is considered one of the founders of Marxist-Leninist theory. She had considerable influence in enriching Marxist libraries with many books and articles.

Rabin joined the Khaduri Agricultural Institute, completing this leftist foundation in which his family raised him. This institute, through its staff and teachers, promoted socialist, utopian ideas, in the sense of concentrating on the land and farming and general humanistic concepts that were close to the concepts of the Russian writer and thinker, Leo Tolstoy.

Yitzhaq Rabin, Politician and Soldier

In terms of his career, Rabin is considered a soldier primarily, until fairly recent times. Even when he was prime minister in the mid-1970's, he had only been a party politician for five years, which he spent in the diplomatic corps when he was his country's ambassador to the United States. With that exception, his career was firmly tied to military work, from Palmach units to occupying the post of chief of staff in the Israeli Army. Even during his political activity, he was given tasks requiring military expertise, such as minister of defense

during the governments of two prime ministers in the middle and late 1980's. Even during now, he occupies the post of minister of defense, in addition to being prime minister.

In evaluating Rabin's personality, some tend to make a distinction between Rabin's political persona and his military persona. The military Rabin is based on being a "hawk" and not susceptible to compromises. He is extreme in military concepts and only accepts definitive decisions. Perhaps, the famous incident that occurred, which led to his collapse shortly before the 1967 war, is proof of that.

If the majority view is that Rabin is considered a hawk on the military side of his life, he is also considered somewhat dovish politically. We should note that what is meant by "dove" here is not Rabin's political position, but that the logic of his political thought is closer to the pragmatists, which justifies his adherence to specific ideology and political thought. However, Yitzhaq Shamir may be described as a rigid ideologue who would never accept any modification in his policies and who is very resistant to any change. Usually his policies are marked by undeviating continuity. If he embarks on any change, it is considered a surrender to specific pressures, which he is slow to do. Yitzhaq Rabin, however, sees change and deals with it at once. He is a skillful tactician and well-developed intellectually. The importance of this is that Rabin has no ideological position in every sense of that word. He is prepared to accommodate the Zionist viewpoint with the requirements of change. He looks out for Israel's best interests and adopts the appropriate position, without isolating it in "Torah-ist" slogans, which would ultimately lead to Israel's efforts being the opposite from world events.

The sixth round of negotiations, and the preceding rounds, give us an example of the pragmatic approach that Rabin uses. Before the last round of negotiations, Rabin had often indicated that the essence of that conflict was with the Palestinians. Therefore, reaching an agreement with the Palestinians was the top priority in the coming negotiations. However, everyone was surprised in the sixth Washington round by the fact that the emphasis was on negotiations with the Syrians and concerned withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Evidently, Rabin's intention was to attempt to force the Arab parties into competition over what the priority should be in the negotiations and, consequently, drag the parties into a race to offer "facilities" for negotiations. This leads to the belief that his purpose in beginning to soften matters with the Syrians was to begin serious negotiations with the Syrians so that they would be the last of those who would be finished with or returned to, after accomplishing something with the Palestinians! As 'Aqiva Eldar in HA'ARETZ said: "In the next few weeks or days, it will possibly become clear that the necessary decision facing the Syrians is a matter that Yitzhaq Rabin cannot carry out nor wants to carry out."

Rabin and America

Perhaps it goes without saying that vis-a-vis the American administration, Rabin is the proper person in the proper place at the proper time. This is not at all strange. Rabin took his first political steps in the American diplomatic arena. He spent five years in Washington as Israel's ambassador to the United States. He might be the Israeli politician who most understands American policy and who is most in tune with it.

During the preparations for the Labor Party's election campaign, Baker asked for a meeting with Yitzhaq Rabin, who was competing with Shimon Peres for party leadership. Evidently, the purpose of this meeting was tantamount to an indication that the administration wanted Rabin to lead the battle with the Liberal Party. At the same time, "he was advised of the American administration's new ideas," according to the statement of Pinhas 'Inbari.

In a special report, published in the Jerusalem newspaper AL-QUDS on 13 September 1992 and written by Maxim Ghilan, he said that the American intelligence agency had a report that it gave to Scowcroft, to the effect that Shimon Peres would lose if the Israeli elections were held. The report also contained an evaluation of Yitzhaq Rabin, the possible prime minister. It noted that Rabin suffered from certain negative factors. He is elderly and was subject to a financial scandal when he was ambassador to Washington (1967-73). He frequently drinks alcohol and talks openly about his secret. He was described as inflexible over the short term, spiteful, and subject to outbursts of anger. On the other hand, he gave Israel its greatest military victory when he was chief of staff during the 1967 war. He is an excellent strategic thinker and a skillful tactician. He was described as a strong personality, capable of making and implementing decisions as part of a broad plan, and he exudes self-confidence and leadership. He enjoys popularity with Israel's hawks and with most members of his party, both hawks and doves. In the final analyses, he is considered a strong man because since he is a former military leader and not a politician, like Peres. Because of all this, American intelligence experts believed that Rabin is the only person upon whom they could bet to oust Shamir from his post. The report went on to say that, therefore, the Rabin-Baker deal was made. This deal was for Rabin to gather his forces in exchange for the American administration's support for his election campaign. The importance of that was that it totally stopped the show of sympathy or neutrality vis-a-vis Shamir's government. Rabin made this agreement, showing his intransigence, strength, and desire to regain his power. This was emphasized by the American administration's waging war against the Israeli Government led by Shamir, since the battlefield shifted to inside the American Congress itself, concerning the question of guarantees. The battle that the American administration waged was basically on behalf of Rabin, preparing for the election of the 13th Knesset.

With regard to negotiations, Rabin relies on the military procedure, even though the leftist environment in which

he was born has given him a kind of tolerance, liberality, and logical thinking that is far from ideological convictions. This mixture has created a one-of-a-kind personality—flexible and tactical—but, one that is harsh in the decisions it makes.

When a group of settlers demonstrated against him, he responded to them calmly: "What the investigation teams are doing in Iraq is more important than your actions." He was referring to the loss of settlements because of their security importance. Rabin would conduct himself with military logic in negotiations. This means that Rabin might direct a feinting maneuver in one area to occupy the enemy in order to execute the attack on another area (as is happening with the Syrians now).

The general upshot is that Rabin "the politician," who studied in the school of American diplomacy during the tenure of Henry Kissinger, author of the "step-by-step" policy, would be unlikely to rush into "regional concessions," especially if they had to do with the Golan Heights. He would attempt, in the first stage, to reach interim, very slow-paced agreements, such as the agreement for self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for example. It is certain that—in negotiations—Rabin's government will not shrink from attempts to brandish the Israeli military stick and attempt to impose reality on the negotiating parties. This requires resolute positions on the part of the Arab negotiators, because every gratis concession with respect to Rabin will be quickly pounced upon to their regret.

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